STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
SURVIVABILITY. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
Purpose. The paper describes main concepts and definitions, survivability indices, methods used to estimate survivability in different external and internal conditions of application of technical systems, including the studies in the field of structural survivability obtained 30 years ago within the frames of the Soviet school of sciences. An attempt is made to overcome different understanding of technical survivability, which has been formed by now in a number of industrial directions - shipping, aviation, communication networks, energy systems, in industries of defense. Besides, the problem is discussed in relation to the establishing of the continuity between technical survivability and global system resilience. Technical survivability is understood in two basic meanings: a) as a property of a system to resist to negative impacts; b) as a property of a system to recover its operability after a failure or accident caused by external reasons. This article also describes the relation between structural survivability, when the logic of system operability is binary and described by a logical function of operability, and functional survivability, when the system operation is described by a criterion of functional efficiency. Thus, a system failure is a fall in the level of its efficiency lower than the value predetermined in advance. Methods. Technical system is considered as a controlled cybernetic system installed with specialized survivability aids (SA). Logical and probabilistic methods and results of combinatorial theory of random placements are used in the analysis. It is supposed that: a) negative external impacts (N1) are occasional and single-shot (one impact affects one element); b) each element of the system has binary logic (operability - failure) and zero resistance, i.e. it is for sure affected by one impact. Henceforth this assumption is generalized for the r-time N1 and L-resistant elements.Besides, the work describes the variants of non-point models when a system’s part or entire system are exposed to a group specialized affection. It runs about the variants of combination of reliability and survivability, when both external and internal failures are analyzed. Results. Different variants of affection and functions of survivability of technical systems are reproduced. It has been educed that these distributions are based on simple and generalized Morgan numbers, as well as Stirling numbers of the second kind that can be reestablished on the basis of simplest recurrence relations. If the allowances of a mathematical model are generalized for the case when there are n of r-time negative external impacts and L- resistant elements, the generalized Morgan numbers which participate in the estimate of the affection law, are defined based о nthe theory of random placements, in the course of n-tuple differentiation of a generator polynomial. In this case it is not possible to establish recurrence relation among generalized Morgan numbers. It is shown that, under uniform allowances for a survivability model (equally resistant elements of the system, equally probable negative external impacts) in the core of relations for the function of system survivability, regardless of the affection law, there is a vector of structure redundancy F(u), where и is the number of affected elements, F(u) is the number of operable states of the technical system under и failures. Conclusion. Point survivability models are a perfect tool to perform an express-analysis of structural complex systems and to obtain approximate estimates of survivability functions. Simplest allowances of structural survivability can be generalized for the case when the logic of system operability is not binary, but is specified by the level of the system efficiency. In this case we should speak about functional survivability. Computational complexity PNP of the task of survivability estimation does not make it possible to solve it by the simplest enumeration of states of the technical system and variants of negative external impacts, it is necessary to look for the ways to egress from the blind enumeration, by transformation of the system operability function and its decomposition, as well. Development and implementation of survivability property into a technical system should be conducted with consideration of the property which is assured in biological and social systems.
PART 2. Multivariate calculations
This paper is a closing article to the first one [1] and it reproduces multivariate calculations by the procedure described in the references. Computational complexity of the task of survivability estimation and the ways to overcome this problem are discussed. We also deal with a passing from structural survivability to the tasks of functional survivability, establishing a conceptual joint between technical survivability and mobilization resilience in economy.
Purpose. Today, the reliability of protection of mission critical objects and objects of increased risk is achieved by applying integrated safety systems, with the integration of subsystems based on control computers. Improvement of survivability of special purpose computers is a critical task that could be solved using the computers with the property of structural stability. Practical realization of such computer is connected with the task of its functional diagnosis and further functional adjustment. This article describes the process of functional diagnosis of structurally stable control computer as a functional system that is fundamentally different from the traditional control of a personal computer made by the known self-checking programs. Methods. To solve the task of functional diagnosis the article offers a mathematical model of test check that may become the basis of functional diagnosis of a control computer. Besides, based on the proposed mathematical model, possible outcomes of the test are analyzed. Results. Analysis of the proposed mathematical model defined the variants of how to minimize the risks of categories I and II, i.e. how to transfer faulty functions to a set of fault-free functions (customer's risk) and to transfer fault-free functions to a set of faulty ones (producer's risk), that is achieved by using a diagnosis practice of “promotion" that is standard for computers. The point is to find an operable “core" - a set of basic functions that help to diagnose the remaining functions of the computer's system of commands. I.e. the “core" with any detected defect is not allowed for further functioning, and a fault-free “core" can serve as rather reliable mean of control. When using this practice, the norm of a single test does not guarantee there is no risk of category I, that explains the common practice of check of each function of the command system by a sufficient sequence of test checks, and the risk of category II does not grow. Conclusion. The proposed model of a functional diagnosis test check made it possible to form the strategy to construct this process for a structurally stable control computer, namely to implement several particular tasks such as: to separate as a specific the task of identification of an operable “core" as a probable cause of risk of category I, that serves as a source of risk of category II; to perform sequential diagnosis of the remaining part of functions as in computing environment with a developed property of slow degradation of functions; to optimize an extending sequence of test checks for each function reducing the risk of category I, irretrievably leading to the growth of time control that is deficit for a pre-staged self-checking; that is also aimed at the adjustment to the current f-state; to proceed with testing in case of negative results using another software implementation to reduce risk of category II; to develop special procedure to substantiate the duration of testing of each function of control computers.
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
Purpose is to develop a procedure for estimating risks that occur as the result of a signal passed at danger (SPAD) by a shunting or train locomotive, as well as to develop recommendations for reducing risks of train collisions when performing shunting movement at a station. Methods. In Oder to achieve the stated purpose, it is necessary to define the average number of points burst open by shunting locomotives without derailment, as well the average number of derailments of shunting locomotives per year. The availa- bile statistics are used to calculate the average amount of damage from one collision, from a point burst open without subsequent derailment, as well as a point burst open with subsequent derailment. To calculate the average number of damage as the result of a certain injury caused by collision, different types of injuries are considered. Injuries are classified by the level of consequences that are calculated in money terms using a minimum wage. To consider the variability in choosing a route, as well as to obtain the probability of a passenger train collision when passing through a station, the formula of total probability is used. To obtain the probabiity of at least one collision per year, the formula of multiplication of probability is used. To obtain the average number of points burst open and derailments, it is necessary to define the total number of points that are crossed by shunting locomotives at a station per point, the formula of multiplication of probability is used. To define the level of risk caused by the respective unfavorable event, it is necessary to construct risk matrices to define whether there is a necessity in immediate actions to reduce a risk level. Results. We have studied the task of calculation of unfavorable events caused by stop signal violation by a passenger train or a shunting locomotive. It provides the formulas used to calculate the probability of at least one collision of a passenger train at a station per year, the average number of points burst open by a shunting locomotive without subsequent derailment, as well as the average number of derailments per year. It also contains the formulas used to calculate the average damage from unfavorable events. Risk matrices for all unfavorable events have been constructed. The article gives the example of application of the obtained results which is based on hypothetical data, real data and expert analysis. Conclusion. Using the developed procedure we demonstrated its practical functionality. It was obtained that for the set of input data which were analyzed, there should not be any measures taken to reduce risks occurred as the result of points burst open and derailments at the station under consideration. At the same time the collision risk is in the orange area - the area of undesirable risks, and therefore, the measures on risk reduction should be taken. And a quantitative value of the risk occurred as the result of points burst open turns out to be higher than that of the collision risk. The matter is that in case of collision JSC RZD bears additional reputational expenses, doubled by the fact that a derailment occurs at a station with large numbers of people.
FUNCTIONAL RELIABILITY. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
Purpose. This article offers to focus on the genesis of dependability of unique safety critical systems specified by low probability of failures, using the example of transformable structures of spacecrafts, in relation to which just the possibility of failures can question the reasonability of their creation. It describes the stage of the life cycle of unique mission critical systems at which the measures taken to improve reliability are the most effective, and the stages at which it is already late to take any measures at all. Methods. Neglecting the genesis of unique mission critical systems will inevitably lead to failures at the stage of operation, and the failures are caused by errors in design, engineering, modeling, as well as by different manufacturing deviations. In practice up to 80% of cases are predetermined before the start of operation - “at a drafting machine” and in manufacturing departments, when something was not thought through, taken into account and controlled, making an error or foozling. Reliability of future products depends on the quality of the decisions taken under development, which directly depend on the principles, rules and requirements used under design and engineering. These notions are interrelated, they have a concrete meaning. Principles are used to develop design solutions. Rules are intermedia between theory and practice, they often reflect the gained experience that should be considered in new developments to avoid repeating the errors. Reliability requirements at the stage of engineering are formed as the result of application of goal-oriented procedures and analyses, being established in graphic and text form in design documentation: in technical requirements and on a draft, as well as in technical specification. Satisfying these requirements is finally aimed at undoubted performance by a product of its functional tasks with predetermined reliability. Results. The aspects described in the article, separate the methods of reliability theory which are based on probabilistic and statistical models, with practical engineering methods aimed at the creation of reliable equipment. The field of reliability theory covers the study of behavior of finished products, proceeding from the information about mathematical models that consider stochastic parameters. Real objects in reliability theory are schematized to the models described by probabilistic dependences and having a sampling that can be used for statistical generalization. In practice though, engineers work having no statistics and concepts of probabilistic behavior of a future product, and the collection of methods and algorithms of its operation makes it possible to influence the reliability of real products. Conclusion. This paper shows that the stages of a life cycle of unique safety critical systems before the stage of operation are strictly differentiated by the efficiency of reliability measures. At each stage it is necessary to use certain reliability algorithms and methods that are specific to this particular stage, which may increase the effectiveness when solving the tasks of reliability of unique safety critical systems.
STANDARTIZATION
Abstract. In 2015 International Electrotechnical Commission adopted a new international standard IEC 60050-192 that specifies the main terms in the field of dependability with their definitions. It was developed by IEC/TC 56 “Dependability" under control of TC 1 “Terminology" and forms Part 192 of International electrotechnical vocabulary. This standard substituted the previous similar standard IEC 60050-191 adopted in 1990. This article is dedicated to IEC 60050-192, acquaintance with which is required for all specialists in the field of dependability. The new standard is compared with the previous IEC 60050-191, and with the similar Russian GOST 27.002-89. In comparison with IEC 60050-191 the new standard contains the modified content and scope, with exclusion of the sections containing the terms related to the quality of services of telecommunication and electric power systems. Based on that, IEC 60050-192 is entitled just with one word “Dependability". Therefore, now it totally corresponds to its status of a horizontal (i.e. inter-industrial, basic) standard. Terminology in the field of dependability is given in respect to a technical item, with analysis of the definitions of this notion, probable structure of the item and the number of terms specifying the types of items. IEC 60050-192 gives a new definition for “dependability": the ability of an item to perform as and when required. This definition was discussed actively, among the IEC experts who took part in the standard development, and among Russian specialists as well. The cluster of features of dependability has also changed: availability, reliability, recoverability, maintainability and maintenance support performance, and in some cases durability, safety and security. A new notion here is “recoverability” defined as ability of an item to recover from a failure, without corrective maintenance. This paper describes the standard's sections dedicated to an item's states and time notions, failures and faults, maintenance and repair, dependability indices, testing, design or engineering, analysis and improvement of dependability. It introduces and explains the most important terms, specifies new terms that were added to the standard, and those excluded from it. The article pays attention to the fact that certain terms have no adequate Russian equivalents. Though the Russian and international dependability terminologies have much in common, there are still significant differences between them. It is explained by the fact that the standardization of dependability terminology in our country that started half a century ago developed for a long time in isolation form similar work world-wide. Due to such differences the creation of a new GOST to be harmonized with IEC 60050-192 is currently not possible. But nevertheless it is necessary to seek to a maximum possible convergence of the Russian and international terminologies.
REPORTS
The continuous increase of traffic and traction loads cause the increase of loads on power supply infrastructure that leads to the growth of levels of electromagnetic emission. It results in the growth of probability of emergency functioning of overhead system because of which currents achieve very high levels that may lead to serious accidents in related circuits of signalling and remote control facilities. Such accidents often cause different failures affecting the quality and safety of railway traffic, they lead to equipment damages, as well be a reason for fire. The strongest contribution to the total number of accidents with cable lines is made by electromagnetic influence in case of heavy train movement. And as the result of such train passing along the lines with failed grounding a cable is burnt through. The requirements for EMC of infrastructure facilities are getting stricter, including the requirements for reliability and information security of communication and signalling systems. Existing methods used to define induced currents and voltages do not take into account loads that occur in today’s volume of traffic, and do not allow to define the dependence on the parameters of grounding of infrastructure facilities. The parameters of lateral facilities are not taken into account as well. These facilities are located along the track on the whole length of railways. Besides, the grounding parameters change in the course of heavy train moving in different areas. That has become very important to simulate electromagnetic processes in multi-wire systems with consideration of inherent and mutual parameters of lines, as well as ground parameters. But mathematical models of electromagnetic compatibility on railway transport due to its complexity do not always help to obtain the numerical values of induced currents and voltages in the communication circuits and signalling. This article describes an application method of simulation modeling that helps to define the levels of induced currents and voltages in the lateral lines of communication and signalling on the sections of heavy train movement. The paper offers the procedure of simulation modeling, simulation results for a line of heavy train movement and the analysis of the impact of grounding parameters on induced voltages. The simulation results were correlated with the experiment data and admitted to be consistent. The calculations made by the suggested procedure helped to reveal the key dependences of induced currents and voltages on ground parameters, as well as nonlinear dependencies of the induced voltage on ground resistance that forms the basis for further studies and correlation of the obtained data with the statistics accumulated during operation.