On a general safety method for new technologies in railway applications
https://doi.org/10.21683/1729-2646-2026-26-2-3-8
Abstract
For more than 150 years (e.g. see Pachl [1]) railways have been very traditional when it came to the safety principles that they applied. Nevertheless, railway safety has become increasingly innovative over the last decades. This started with electronic interlockings that required a new type of standard, such as EN 50716 [2] and EN 50129 [3]. This has led to a completely new approach to assessing whether an electronic device is safe, i.e. the safety assessment. New developments such as automatic underground railways, Automatic Train Operation (ATO), the Hyperloop (a Maglev train running in a low-pressure tube), the use of hydrogen as fuel, the implementation of artificial intelligence, as well as the increasing importance of cybersecurity all require further development of the safety assessment methods. In this paper, an approach to railway system safety with innovative technology is shown and the challenges connected with the safety assessment are discussed.
About the Author
H. SchäbeGermany
Hendrik Schäbe, Doctor of natural sciences, Independent Expert
Cologne
References
1. Pachl J. Railway Signalling Principles. Braunschweig; 2021. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
2. EN 50716: Railway Applications – Requirements for software development; 2023.
3. EN 50129: Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic systems for signalling; 2018.
4. IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related systems, Parts 1 – 7, 2010.
5. EN 50126: Railway Applications – The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) – Part 1: Generic RAMS Process, 2017.
6. Schäbe, H., Verification and Assessment in Railway Safety. In: Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference, Research Publishing. Singapore; 2019. Pp. 1685-1690.
7. CSM – COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1136 of 13 July 2015 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment; 2015.
8. ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2014/78, Uniform provisions concerning the approval of motor vehicles and their components with regard to the safety related performance of hydrogen-fuelled vehicles.
9. MBO – Magnetschwebebahnverordnung, Bundesgesetzblatt 1997, Teil 1, Nr. 64, 25.9.1997.
10. Hyperloop systems – Standards Inventory and Roadmap Technical report TP CEN/CLC/TR 17912:2023.
11. Braband J. Approach for a Risk Analysis for Automated Train Operation, Signalling and Datacommunication (113) 10/2021, 25-34.
12. DIN VDE V 0831-103: Elektrische Bahnsignalanlagen – Teil 103: Ermittlung von Sicherheitsanforderungen an technische Funktionen in der Eisenbahnsignaltechnik, 2020.
13. Adebahr F., Schäbe H. Probability of human error and failure rates of technical ATO systems, Signalling and Datacommunication, 3/2023. Pp. 21-29.
14. Schäbe H., Shubinsky I.B., Rozenberg E.N. Various approaches to autonomous driving in railways. Dependability 2025;25(1):4-10. (In Russ.)
15. Braband J., Schäbe H. The application of artificial intelligence in railway technology for safety-relevant applications – opportunities and problems. Signalling and Datacommunication 2022;5(114):14-21.
16. Braband J., Schäbe H. On safety assessment of artificial intelligence. Dependability 2020;20(4):25-34.
17. ISO / PAS 8800 Road Vehicles: Safety and Artificial Intelligence; 2024.
18. Schäbe H., Shubinski I.B., Rozenberg E.N. Evaluating the limits of misclassification probability. Case study of hazardous failure prediction. Dependability 2024;24(3):18-23. (In Russ.)
19. Schäbe H., Shubinski I.B. How to Properly Apply Systems of Artificial Intelligence. RT&A 2024; 4(80):31-25.
20. CLC/TS 50701 VDE V 0115-701:2022-11, Railway Application – Cybersecurity Bahnanwendungen IT-Sicherheit: 2022-10-14.
21. Bock H-H., Braband J., Milius B., Schäbe H. Towards an IT Security Protection Profile for Safety-Related Communication in Railway Automation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security 2012;7612:137-148.
22. Braband J., Schäbe H. Safety vs. Security – Why Architecture makes the Difference. RT&A 2021;4(65):88-93. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24412/1932-2321-2021-465-88-93.
Review
For citations:
Schäbe H. On a general safety method for new technologies in railway applications. Dependability. 2026;26(2):3-8. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.21683/1729-2646-2026-26-2-3-8
Views:
74
JATS XML
ISSN 1729-2646 (Print)
ISSN 2500-3909 (Online)
ISSN 2500-3909 (Online)
Email this article 