Conceptual problems of transportation security of intelligent water transportation systems

Aim. Autonomous and remote-controlled surface sea vessel (ASSV) and unmanned inland water vessels (UIWV) are entering the waterways. The infrastructure of waterways is becoming intelligent. The intellectual level of sea and river ports, port terminals, and harbours is improving. Large-scale deployment of information technologies, automated control, automatic control, and artificial intelligence has significantly expanded the landscape of transportation security threats to water intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and now includes non-physical threats. The evolving threat landscape requires timely response in order to avoid gaps between the current state of intellectual technology application and the set of measures to ensure the transportation security of water ITS. Problems. Spoofing or modifying sensors readings in ASSV (UIWV) or signals received by their executive units can cause vessels to lose direction and collide with each other or with infrastructure facilities, run aground, or even being hijacked along with the passengers, cargo, and attendants. Unauthorized access to information in automated control systems of port terminals can be used to maliciously encrypt information. That may block cargo handling operations in a port, disrupt ship traffic schedules and logistics operations up to the national level. National-level consequences can be classified as a disruption of the national information infrastructure security associated with the transportation insecurity in ITS. The various existing ITS have the common problem associated with the digital inequality of the automated systems employed by industrial enterprises and corporate governance in terms of the security of the above technologies. Methods. Ensuring the transportation security of water ITS requires the application of all available methods, means, and measures of protection. The legal framework of transportation security is to take into account the full range of relevant methods of illegal interference into the operation of water ITS and require planning and implementing a corresponding set of protective measures. The article uses methods of systems analysis and comprehensive security of complex systems. Results. The author analysed the new types of threats to the transportation security of water transportation systems and the corresponding regulatory framework. It was identified that the latter do not take into account the new types of threats to the transportation security of water transportation systems. Consequently, those are not covered by the transportation security planning. The paper examines the architecture of water ITS in the form of an integrated automated system of corporate and process management, whose application aims to dynamically coordinate water ITS models with those of current information-related threats to the transportation security. Conclusion. Ensuring the transportation security of water ITS requires taking into account the new types of threats associated with undocumented capabilities and vulnerabilities of information technologies, automated control, automatic control, and artificial intelligence technologies. The examined problems are of a systemic nature, since illegal interference in the operation of water ITS can negatively affect other systems of critical information infrastructure. That should be taken into account when developing regulations related to ensuring the transportation security of water and other modes of transportation.

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